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Abstract 
 
Fund companies and banks argue that letting them manage one’s money is a wise decision. They argue 
that they are able to create substantial growth in value for the investor without requiring any other 
input than a small fee and an amount to be invested. This essay tests this claim in a two folded 
analysis.  
Time series data with historical value developments of 24 out of the 30 largest Swedish equity funds, 
along with the value development of the MSCI Sweden SEK stock market index, is used in the 
analysis. The first part of the analysis uses descriptive statistics of fund net returns and the benchmark 
index returns to assess whether or not fund managers are able to exploit statistical arbitrage 
opportunities in the Swedish equity market. It is concluded that fund managers are able to do this and 
consequently create average excess net returns that are greater than zero at an 80% confidence level.  
The second part of the analysis investigates if it is really worth the cost of fees to let an actively 
managed fund take care of one’s investment. The fact that fund managers are able to create positive 
excess returns is not good enough a reason to motivate fund investment on its own. It is investigated if 
the best three funds in the data set are able to outperform an active, but free, investment strategy that 
does not require financial sophistication. The investment strategy is based on a GARCH(2,1) model 
which is used to forecast the returns of the benchmark index and guide investment decisions. The 
second part of the analysis concludes that the funds are outperforming the proposed investment 
strategy on average, indicating that there is merit to the fund companies’ claim; it is worth the cost of 
fees to have one’s money looked after by an actively managed fund, given that the choice of fund is a 
well-informed decision. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Banks and fund companies often argue that a private investor should buy their funds as doing so lies in 
the person’s own interest. Allegedly the investor will earn money, without actively doing anything. To 
a skeptical person this may sound as a rare arbitrage opportunity, since the concept of arbitrage can 
indeed be described as a money-for-nothing type of situation, in which an agent can exploit price gaps 
to create a profit. In this essay it will be explained why or perhaps why not there is merit to the fund 
companies’ claim. Can an investor really earn money, in real terms rather than nominal, by simply 
investing a chosen amount in a fund and sitting back, waiting for the money to grow in value? And if 
this is case, is it really worth paying the required fees to have fund companies manage the investment? 
In order to answer these questions one will first need to determine whether or not fund managers are 
actually creating extra value, as compared to just investing in an equity index for free. In order to 
explain this, the concept of arbitrage is introduced and explained. It is also determined whether or not 
it is reasonable that arbitrage exists in the equity markets. Secondly, one will need to empirically 
determine if fund managers are skilled enough to capitalize off of these potential arbitrage 
opportunities. After all, if a private investor is going to earn money from buying the funds, net of fees, 
the fund’s manager needs to be able to spot and exploit the market’s statistical arbitrage opportunities 
well enough to create a substantial growth in the fund’s value. Lastly, a comparison between the 
performance of professional fund managers and the performance of a rational, but financially 
uneducated, investor is made. This determines if the service provided by fund managers is actually 
worth its cost.  
This essay will move on to explaining the concept of arbitrage and assessing whether or not it exists 
on equity markets. This assessment is based on an examination of some of the vast body of literature 
on the subject. After concluding that it is theoretically feasible for someone to observe arbitrage 
opportunities in equity markets it will be empirically investigated if fund managers are able to exploit 
these opportunities. Time-series data with the value development of 24 of the 30 largest Swedish 
equity funds, along with the value development of the underlying benchmark index, will be used to 
analyze the performance of actively managed funds. Since this essay means to determine if the 
decision to invest in funds is a wise one, the analysis determines if it is better to let a fund company 
manage one’s money than just investing it by oneself. If a fund manager is consistently able to exploit 
the statistical arbitrage opportunities in the equity market, it is wise to let him or her manage one’s 
investment, and if the manager is in fact outperforming the market index, one should be able to 
observe this as the manager’s fund is yielding abnormal positive returns. Beating the market is exactly 
the point of actively managed funds. It is argued, at least by companies that manage funds actively, 
that the financial professionals analyzing the market will be able to spot and exploit situations of asset 
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mispricing. From the private investor’s perspective, letting a fund company invest one’s money should 
hence result in more or less risk free profits. Whether or not this is the case is a very intriguing 
question and it is now explained how the data in this essay is treated in order to provide an answer to 
it.  
The research purpose of the essay is two folded. The first part is an empirical investigation of the 
returns achieved by actively managed funds. Funds’ historical returns are compared to the 
development of the benchmark index in order to determine if fund managers are able to exploit 
statistical arbitrage opportunities. Descriptive statistics regarding the funds’ excess returns are used to 
settle this issue. It is concluded that fund managers are able to consistently beat the benchmark index, 
net of fees. The results from this part of the analysis are found in section 4.1.  
The second part of the analysis aims at determining if it is worth paying the fees to have one’s 
investment looked after by an actively managed fund. Good funds, in the sense that they create high 
returns, are beating index, but that does not automatically imply that they are a good option for an 
investor. If a private investor without extensive financial knowledge can create an investment strategy 
that generates as high returns as those achieved by funds, it is not an economically sound decision to 
pay a fund to manage one’s money. In order to test this, an investment strategy which is purely 
empirical is created. It is based on a GARCH(2,1) time series model that is used to forecast the returns 
of the benchmark index. How this is done is explained in more detail in 4.2. The results from the 
second part of the analysis show that fund managers are in fact outperforming the proposed investment 
strategy, which indicates that fund investment is worth the cost of fees.    
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2. Background on Arbitrage 
 
In this section the concepts of arbitrage and statistical arbitrage are explained. Previously published 
literature on the topic is reviewed and at the end of the section one finds a paragraph that briefly 
summarizes what can be concluded from the literature study. It is also clarified how these findings 
relate to the research question of determining whether or not a private investor will earn money, in real 
terms, by buying equity funds.    
The definition of arbitrage has been formulated numerous times, but the essence of it is best explained 
by this “joke”: A normal person and a financial mathematician are walking down the street. The 
normal person spots a $100 bill and attempts to pick it up. ‘Don’t try that!’ says the mathematician ‘if 
there really was a $100 bill there, somebody would’ve already picked it up!’ The idea is that there can 
be no hundred dollar bills lying around, because if there were, somebody would immediately pick 
them up (Dalbaen and Schachermayer, 2006). As most of us know from experience, though, finding a 
couple of coins or a small bill on the sidewalk can happen, why Dalbaen and Schachermayer also 
provide an extension to the above joke that is better suited for a financial context: True arbitrage 
would imply that the average guy finds a money pump along the street.  
The analogy lends itself to this essay quite well. After all, if one invests in an asset, say an equity fund, 
that person postpones some of his or her consumption for now but the fund will possibly generate high 
returns year after year, assuming that the fund companies and banks are correct in their claim. If one 
discounts the future returns generated by the fund, one can use the present value to determine whether 
or not the future earnings generated by fund will be worth the wait. If the fund’s future values are 
discounted and the discounted value is higher than the invested amount, the person has found a $100 
bill, so to speak. If an investor can find these $100 bills repeatedly, he or she has found a money 
pump. What is investigated in this section of the essay is whether or not it is feasible that somebody 
would be able to find something similar to a ’money pump’.  
An elementary and well-known concept in finance is the law of one price. It states that arbitrage 
activity should eventually result in the prices of identical assets being equal, as unlimited risk-free 
profits could be made otherwise (Pasquariello, 2014). This clearly implies that there should be no 
arbitrage opportunities in the long run. The law of one price is however an old idea and it might be 
obsolete today. The number of recent papers and articles investigating the topic of stock market 
arbitrage is enormous, and the empirical results in many of these indicate that there are in fact 
arbitrage opportunities in the financial markets. More specifically, these papers conclude that there are 
statistical arbitrage opportunities and the concept of statistical arbitrage is explained here. 
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Fernholz and Maguire (2007) explain what the concept of statistical arbitrage actually is in a paper 
titled The Statistics of Statistical Arbitrage. The verbal explanation of the concept is that when the 
expected return of buying an asset, holding it for a given period of time, and then selling it is greater 
than zero, in net present value, a statistical arbitrage opportunity has presented itself. The key concept 
here, of course, is the expected return. The authors provide different portfolio strategies that are 
expected to yield positive returns, but all of them share one common feature. Using time series data 
for one entire day of trading on both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock 
Exchange (NASDAQ), the authors estimate volatilities for different large-cap stocks and compare 
these sector-wise, i.e. the volatility of a car manufacturer’s stock is compared to the stocks of other car 
manufacturers. For the sake of this explanation, let us assume that the volatility of one stock is greater 
than the volatility of the rest of the companies within a given sector, and that these companies’ stocks 
are roughly equally volatile. The excess volatility is exploited to generate positive returns by selling 
the asset when its price is greater than the sector benchmark price, which is usually made up of a 
weighted average of all the sector stock prices, and re-buying the asset when its price is lower than the 
benchmark price. The authors find that the expected return of such strategies is indeed greater than 
zero, which supports the idea that there are statistical arbitrage opportunities on equity markets. They 
also conclude that implementing such a strategy is both data and software demanding, why it is not 
likely to ever be realized by most amateur investors. 
Another paper that investigates statistical arbitrage on the American equities markets is written by 
Avellaneda and Lee (2009) and titled Statistical Arbitrage in the US Equities Markets. Their analysis 
is based on a similar idea to the one in performed by Fernholz and Maguire (2007). It is assumed that 
some individual stocks are idiosyncratically over-sensitive, meaning that they overreact to news 
affecting the market, as compared to other stocks within the same business sector. These overreactions 
result in periods of mispricing of the stock which can be exploited to generate positive returns. The 
authors find that stock prices are mean reverting, which gives rise to similar trading strategies as 
described by Fernholz and Maguire (2007) with the difference that Avellaneda and Lee follow a 
long/short-trading strategy instead of a buy, sell, and re-buy strategy. A merit of Avellaneda’s and 
Lee’s paper is that it discusses more extensively how an investor is supposed to find out whether or 
not the stock should be bought or “shorted”. The most intuitively compelling suggestion is to regress 
the stock price on the price of exchange traded funds (ETFs), made up of stocks in the relevant 
business sector. The stock price and the price of the ETF are realistically assumed to be affected in the 
same direction by business related news. As the stock is idiosyncratically oversensitive the regression 
coefficient is > 1, i.e. the stock price varies more than the price of the ETF. When the price of the ETF 
increases, the stock is bought, and as soon as the price increase of the ETF flattens out or is reversed, a 
short position is taken in the stock.  The authors find that such a trading strategy yields positive returns 
over time, again supporting the notion that there are statistical arbitrage opportunities on equities 
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markets, but it is obviously not without risk. Since all stocks are associated with idiosyncratic risk the 
investor will lose every now and then, which means that the strategy requires a large financial buffer-
zone to make sure that the investor can cope with temporary losses. The average return is however 
greater than zero over time. It should also be mentioned that the proposed trading strategy is sensitive 
to timing, so it requires much activity and monitoring from the investor.   
The two papers described immediately above are obviously arguing that statistical arbitrage 
opportunities exist. This perhaps seems a bit contradictory to somebody who has studied the more 
classical ideas of efficient financial markets. Bondarenko (2003) offers an implicit explanation to this 
in his paper Statistical Arbitrage and Securities Prices. He argues that the possible existence of 
statistical arbitrage opportunities depends on whether or not investors are using historical information 
when evaluating future returns on investments. The arguments being made in the paper rely heavily on 
the concept of the pricing kernel, or stochastic discount factor, which is of fundamental importance in 
asset pricing theory. A brief explanation of the concept is provided here:  
An asset is traded at time 𝑡𝑡 =  1, … ,𝑇𝑇. The asset is assumed to be bought at 𝑡𝑡 = 0. The asset’s price at 
time 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 and 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = 𝑣𝑣0, … , 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 is the pricing history of the asset up until time t. Let 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 denote the 
payoff received when the asset is sold in period t. Then the pricing kernel, or stochastic discount 
factor, is any variable that satisfies 𝐸𝐸[𝑚𝑚�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖] = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑇𝑇], i.e. 𝑚𝑚�  is the pricing kernel.  
Bondarenko argues that the functional form of the pricing kernel determines whether or not statistical 
arbitrage opportunities will exist or not when theoretical models regarding assets’ prices are made. 
Bondarenko’s conclusion suggests that when the pricing kernel is path independent, i.e. it depends 
only on the utility of the asset’s payoff, 𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡), no statistical arbitrage opportunities may exist. This 
essentially means that every investor values an asset based on his or her expected utility. As 
everybody has different utility functions and 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 cannot be known in advance, trading strategies that 
yield expected returns > 0 over time cannot be formulated. The mathematical derivations of these 
arguments will not be formally explained or evaluated here since the purpose of this essay is not to 
determine the precise accuracy of Bondarenko’s conclusions, but the paper has some interesting 
implications. As mentioned above, recent papers based on empirical research find that there may exist 
statistical arbitrage opportunities in equity markets. This can seem contradictive if one looks at some 
of the theory regarding financial assets, but theory may be misguiding in the sense that assumptions 
about investor behavior do not reflect reality.  
Alexander and Dimitriu (2005) are testing portfolio management strategies that take historical prices 
of assets into account, i.e. strategies that are path dependent, in their paper Indexing and Statistical 
Arbitrage. They use historical data from the American S&P 100 index and use this price data to create 
portfolios that are cointegrated with some benchmark index. The basic idea of this purely statistical 
approach is that the cointegrated portfolio is mean reverting. Alexander and Dimitriu formulate a long-
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short-approach, very similar to the one Avellaneda and Lee use, but with different buy- or sell signals. 
Another difference between the two papers is that Avellaneda and Lee base the fact that stock prices 
are mean reverting, if the relevant benchmark index is found, on previous research findings, whereas 
Alexander and Dimitriu check statistically if the portfolio is cointegrated with the benchmark, and thus 
mean-reverting, using regression- and residual analysis.  Alexander and Dimitriu use price spreads, the 
difference between the price of the index and the price of the portfolio. Let 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 denote the price of the 
index and 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 the price of the portfolio at time t. Then if 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 > 0, it is a buy-signal, meaning that a 
long position in the portfolio is taken, and when 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 < 0 a short position is taken. The results of 
the paper show the cointegrated portfolio generates expected returns that are greater than zero and 
statistically significant.  
Most recent papers regarding statistical arbitrage opportunities show some evidence of their existence, 
at least when asset management strategies are empirically based. This, as has been mentioned, can 
seem quite unintuitive to somebody who believes in the theories regarding market efficiency. One of 
the reasons behind this phenomenon could be that investors are significantly limited in their ability to 
exploit arbitrage opportunities, e.g. by not being able to take short positions, why a mispriced asset can 
remain mispriced for a substantial period of time, as is argued by Ling, et al. (2014). This is connected 
to the efficient market hypothesis, which was originally formulated by Eugene Fama. The hypothesis 
is explained in a pedagogical way by Ausloos, et al., (2016) in their article On the “Usual” 
Misunderstanding between Econophysics and Finance: Some Clarifications on Modelling Approaches 
and Efficient Market Hypothesis. Fama’s theory suggests that assets’ prices are based on all available 
information, and that it should not be possible to consistently beat the market. Whether or not market 
participants have all information necessary to correctly value assets and make completely rational 
investment decisions is however something that has not yet been agreed upon. This issue is one of the 
reasons why the topic of arbitrage receives so much attention. There is no clear intuitive answer to the 
question.   
Bidima and Rasonyi (2012) is one of the papers investigating the topic of stock market arbitrage. The 
authors investigate different trading strategies mathematically and find that even with very loose 
assumptions and restrictions one can find asymptotic arbitrage in the (very) long run. The paper is 
very mathematically involved why the details will not be explained here. It is more interesting to see 
that it can be shown mathematically that arbitrage might exist, and also that exploiting it may require a 
very long period of time. Perhaps longer than most peoples’ investment horizons. 
Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2010) is another example of a paper that investigates the existence of 
arbitrage on the stock markets. The authors make a time series analysis of stock prices of American 
companies traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ. The goal of their investigation is to check if there is 
empirical evidence for arbitrage opportunities. For an arbitrage opportunity to arise the stock needs to 
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be mispriced, and one of the merits of this paper is that the authors use more than one measurement of 
stock mispricing to check their results, ultimately making their conclusion more robust. They find that 
there appears to be arbitrage opportunities that persist over time, even when well informed, 
sophisticated traders can see that the stock is mispriced. Their explanation relies quite heavily on the 
idea of idiosyncratic risk, which arguably deters arbitrageurs from trying to exploit the arbitrage 
opportunity. If the stock is sensitive to non-market factors, its price can be very hard to predict. Even 
when it is obviously mispriced sophisticated investors cannot predict its next move, why they do not 
act on the opportunity to potentially earn money. Even arbitrageurs appear to be risk averse.    
Cao and Han (2016) find results in line with Doukas’s and Pantzalis’s in a paper titled Idiosyncratic 
Risk, Costly Arbitrage, and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns. They investigate whether idiosyncratic 
risk can serve as a proxy for arbitrage costs. They investigate mispriced stocks with different 
idiosyncratic risk ranks and check how fast the price gaps of these stocks are eliminated. Indeed they 
find that price gaps of idiosyncratically volatile stocks are persistent. Quite likely due to arbitrageurs’ 
risk aversion. Their measurement of idiosyncratic risk is calculated with the residuals from Fama’s 
and French’s three-factor-model for stock returns (Fama & French, 1992). The three-factor-model is a 
regression model formulated in the following way by Cao and Han:  
 
?̂?𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟.𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 +  𝛽𝛽 ∗ (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟.𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓) + 𝑏𝑏2 ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 − 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐. ) + + 𝑏𝑏3 ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵. 𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀.− 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 𝐵𝐵. 𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀. ) 
 
The variables in the three factor model refer to the risk free rate of return, taken from government 
bonds, the market rate of return, which reflects the return of the stock market index, the difference 
between the company’s market capitalizations and large-cap companies, and difference between 
company’s book-to-market price ratio and the book-to-market price ratio of ‘expensive’ companies. 
The three-factor-model’s residuals are saved and eventually used as measurements of idiosyncratic 
risk. The 𝛽𝛽 in the above model is the conventional finance- 𝛽𝛽, measuring the ration between an asset’s 
volatility and the asset’s covariance with the market. Cao and Han also use different metrics for the 
price gap, giving their result an extra dimension of robustness. 
 
Previous paragraphs touched on the subject that arbitrage opportunities might arise because people are 
not utilizing all available information. One could debate whether or not the information is available for 
ages, but Jin (2014) takes a slightly different and perhaps more pragmatic approach. It is basically 
stated that whether or not the information is available is perhaps not the most relevant thing to look at, 
since even if the information is available it would not be of any use unless investors pay attention to it. 
He checks this by investigating if stocks that receive more attention are less mispriced. Mispricing in 
this paper is determined within a large dataset of American stocks by taking the inverse of size-
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adjusted one-, two-, and three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The stocks’ returns are compared 
to their industry benchmarks to determine whether or not they are abnormal.  The amount of attention 
a stock receives is quantified using a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if one or more analysts are 
actively following the stock and 0 otherwise. The attention-dummy, along with other controls, is 
included on the right hand side of a linear regression model with stock mispricing as dependent 
variable. The results show that stocks being followed by analysts are indeed less mispriced. 
 
Several of the above described papers use different signals for, or measurements of, stock mispricing, 
which invites a reader to ask what definition of mispricing should be used. Chen, Lung, and Wang 
(2009) investigate different mispricing theories in their article Stock Market Mispricing: Money 
Illusion or Resale Option? They check, using regression models, which of the theories – the money 
illusion theory that relates mispricing to faulty inflation expectations, or the resale option which relates 
mispricing to investors’ subjective expectations on dividend growth rates – that create the most 
suitable measurement of stock mispricing. The latter of the two theories split investors into two 
groups, one is more optimistic than the other, although which is which can change. This means that the 
ownership of a stock can shift, depending on which group is more optimistic. This raises stock 
turnover and gives rise to buy-and-sell strategies. Besides inflating the stock’s value, it also results in 
greater volatility. They find that the different measurements of stock mispricing work better or worse 
during different time periods.  
From the literature reviewed above one can conclude the following: Empirically, there appears to be 
evidence that statistical arbitrage opportunities exist. Classic theories such as the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis and the Law of One Price state that there should be no arbitrage opportunities, since asset 
prices allegedly reflect all available information. Studies, however, show that investors are not using 
all available information and that the risk aversion of investors can lead to persistent mispricing of 
stocks. An example of such a study is Jin (2014). Periods of assets mispricing are longer than 
suggested by classic theory, and the persistent mispricing situations can potentially be exploited by 
skillful and knowledgeable investors. This motivates the research question in this essay. There appears 
to be statistical arbitrage opportunities in the financial markets, and the question is whether 
professionals in the financial industry are skillful enough to exploit them over and over again. The 
fund companies and banks themselves argue that they are. If this is truly the case, fund investments 
should generate safe, positive returns for the average private investor.      
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3. Data  
 
This section of the essay describes the data being analyzed and explains what transformations that are 
made. The data analyzed in the essay is taken from Morningstar’s historical data of funds’ value 
development. Historical data for 24 out of the 30 biggest Swedish equity funds are included in the data 
set along with the MSCI Sweden SEK stock market index. The time series contain monthly data that 
start in June 2005 and continue up until March 2017, resulting in 142 observed time periods for the 24 
funds and the index, which yields 3550 total observations. Six out of the 30 biggest funds are excluded 
because data is only available for shorter time periods. A graphical illustration of the data is presented 
in figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: Value Development of Funds & Index 
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The funds’ value developments, depicted in the figure above, are transformed to fund returns. The 
fund companies’ monthly fees (Morningstar, retrieved 2017-04) are then subtracted from the returns to 
generate time series with net fund returns. The descriptive statistics for all the funds’ net returns and 
the index’s returns are presented in table 1  below.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Net Fund Returns, in % 
Fund Mean Standard Error Median Skewness 
Aktie-Ansvar Sverige A 0.816 0.372 1.360 -1.245 
AMF Aktiefond Sverige 0.938 0.378 1.491 -1.135 
AstraZeneca Allemansfond 0.863 0.313 1.297 -0.661 
Carnegie Sverigefond 0.924 0.362 1.538 -1.121 
Catella Reavinstfond 0.718 0.401 1.221 -1.321 
Cliens Sverige A 0.970 0.369 1.736 -1.022 
Cliens Sverige B 0.983 0.371 1.801 -1.014 
Danske Invest Sverige 0.791 0.408 1.187 -0.537 
Didner & Gerge Aktiefond 1.016 0.415 1.476 -0.198 
Enter Sverige 0.757 0.391 1.324 -1.167 
Gustavia Sverige SEK 0.819 0.404 1.487 -0.694 
Handelsbanken Sverige Selektiv 0.814 0.357 1.315 -1.119 
Handelsbanken Sverigefond 0.816 0.378 1.389 -1.097 
Handelsbanken Sverigefond Index 0.845 0.376 1.352 -1.065 
Index 0.770 0.381 1.170 -1.118 
Länsförsäkringar Sverige Aktiv A 0.785 0.365 1.244 -1.072 
Monyx Svenska Aktier 0.772 0.359 1.296 -1.065 
Nordea Alfa 0.614 0.353 1.336 -1.226 
Nordea Swedish Stars icke-utd 0.740 0.373 1.289 -0.979 
Öhman Sverige Smart Beta 0.817 0.374 1.393 -1.014 
Skandia Sverige 0.730 0.371 1.238 -1.187 
Spiltan Aktiefond Stabil 0.918 0.283 1.154 -0.660 
Swedbank Humanfond 0.717 0.386 1.260 -1.179 
Swedbank Robur Ethica Sverige 0.632 0.387 1.189 -1.187 
Swedbank Robur Sverigefond 0.796 0.388 1.441 -1.098 
Note: Mean, Standard Error, and Median are measured in % 
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The stationarity of the time series with funds’ net returns and the index returns are checked using 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, and all the time series are stationary. The test results are presented in 
the following table: 
Table 2: Net Returns Stationarity Tests 
Fund t-Statistics P-value 
Aktie-Ansvar Sverige A -8.683 0.000*** 
AMF Aktiefond Sverige -8.911 0.000*** 
AstraZeneca Allemansfond -10.106 0.000*** 
Carnegie Sverigefond -9.222 0.000*** 
Catella Reavinstfond -8.656 0.000*** 
Cliens Sverige A -9.134 0.000*** 
Cliens Sverige B -9.077 0.000*** 
Danske Invest Sverige -8.814 0.000*** 
Didner & Gerge Aktiefond -8.727 0.000*** 
Enter Sverige -8.973 0.000*** 
Gustavia Sverige SEK -8.207 0.000*** 
Handelsbanken Sverige Selektiv -8.933 0.000*** 
Handelsbanken Sverigefond -9.106 0.000*** 
Handelsbanken Sverigefond Index -8.694 0.000*** 
Index -9.128 0.000*** 
Länsförsäkringar Sverige Aktiv A -9.171 0.000*** 
Monyx Svenska Aktier -9.301 0.000*** 
Nordea Alfa -9.252 0.000*** 
Nordea Swedish Stars icke-utd -8.997 0.000*** 
Öhman Sverige Smart Beta -9.170 0.000*** 
Skandia Sverige -8.987 0.000*** 
Spiltan Aktiefond Stabil -9.106 0.000*** 
Swedbank Humanfond -8.704 0.000*** 
Swedbank Robur Ethica Sverige -8.783 0.000*** 
Swedbank Robur Sverigefond -8.843 0.000*** 
Note: The significance codes are the following: ‘*’ implies significance at the 0,05 level, ‘**’ signals significance at the 0,01 
level, and ‘***’ means that the parameter is significant at the 0,001 level. The null hypothesis is that the true parameter is 
equal to 0 for all parameters. 
A graphical illustration of the funds’ net returns and the index return is presented in figure 2 below. 
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Figure 2: Net Fund Returns & Index Returns 
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4. Results 
 
The empirical analysis in this essay is based mainly on methods outlined in Enders, 2015, but is also 
inspired by the papers Rating Equity Funds against Return of Random Traders, by Hung, et. al., 2014, 
and The Index Fund Rationality Paradox, 2010, by Boldin and Cici. Both these papers show that 
returns of funds tend to track returns of their underlying benchmark very closely. The funds analyzed 
in this essay are all benchmarked against the same stock market index, the MSCI Sweden SEK index, 
and all the funds are in fact linear combinations of this index. This fact, along with the papers 
mentioned just above and inspection of figure 2 in the Data section, motivate the strategy to compare 
fund returns to the underlying benchmark index in order to assess the funds’ performances. 
4.1 Fund Managers Ability to Exploit Statistical Arbitrage 
 
The first step of the analysis is to investigate the historical returns achieved by the included funds. 
From an inspection of figure 1 it is clear that there are funds that underperform and consistently drag 
below the index, as well as there are funds that consistently outperform the index. Before a more 
detailed analysis of specific funds is made it is interesting to examine net fund returns in general. A 
graphical illustration of these numbers is found in figure 3 and statistical results regarding net fund 
returns in general are presented in table 3 below.  
Figure 3: Distribution of Fund Net Returns 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, Net Fund Returns 
Descriptive Statistics, Net Fund Returns (in %) 
Mean 0.816 
Median 1.377 
Standard Error 0.076 
Skewness -0.996 
CI, Lower Bound 0.667 
CI, Upper Bound 0.965 
Note: The confidence interval in the table is the 95% confidence level interval. 
Just a quick glance at the numbers in the table above confirms that funds’ net returns are significantly 
different from zero in general. This can be interpreted as fund investment being a good idea for the 
private investor, seeing as the average net return is significantly positive. The confidence interval 
ranges from roughly 0.67% to 0.97%. It is however the case that the performances of the different 
funds in the data vary to a great extent, so determining that fund investment is a good idea solely on 
these general numbers is a premature conclusion. As previously mentioned, there are a few funds that 
are consistently underperforming compared to the index, as well as there is a number of funds that are 
consistently outperforming the index, why the three best and the three worst funds are extracted from 
the data and analyzed on their own. Average monthly net returns are used to determine how good or 
bad the funds’ performances have been, and the three funds with the highest average net returns are 
Didner & Gerge Aktiefond (1.016%), Cliens Sverige B (0.983%), and Cliens Sverige A (0.970%). The 
three funds with the lowest average net returns are Nordea Alfa (0.614%), Swedbank Robur Ethica 
Sverige (0.632%), and Swedbank Humanfond (0.717%). The historical value development of these six 
funds is depicted in figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4: Value Development of Best & Worst Three Funds 
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The relevant statistics for these six funds are presented in table 4 below.  
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics, Net Fund Returns of Best and Worst Funds 
 Mean Median Standard Error Skewness 
CI, Lower 
Bound 
CI, Upper 
Bound 
Descriptive Statistics, Net Fund Returns, Best Three Funds (in %) 
Didner & Gerge 
Aktiefond 
1.016 1.476 0.415 -0.198 0.196 1.837 
Cliens Sverige B 0.983 1.801 0.371 -1.014 0.251 1.716 
Cliens Sverige A 0.970 1.736 0.369 -1.022 0.240 1.670 
Descriptive Statistics, Net Fund Returns, Worst Three Funds (in %) 
Swedbank Robur 
Ethica Sverige 
0.632 1.189 0.387 -1.187 -0.133 1.397 
Nordea Alfa 0.614 1.336 0.353 -1.226 -0.084 1.312 
Swedbank 
Humanfond 
0.717 1.260 0.387 -1.179 -0.047 1.481 
Note: The confidence interval in the table is the 95% confidence level interval. 
If an investor is primarily interested in the returns of funds, she/he will not invest in the worst three 
funds, but might find the top three interesting. The information regarding fund performance is 
publically available so it is reasonable that an investor will avoid the poorly performing funds. A 
graphical illustration of the net returns of the best three funds is found in figure 5 below. 
Figure 5: Net Fund Returns, Best Three Funds 
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Table 5 below describes the excess net returns, 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, of the three best funds, where 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 is the 
return achieved by the fund in period t and 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 refers to the return generated by passively owning the 
benchmark index portfolio in period t. 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics, Excess Net Returns, Best Three Funds 
Descriptive Statistics, Excess Returns, Best Three Funds (in %) 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Error 
Skewness 
CI, Lower 
Bound 
CI, Upper 
Bound 
Didner & Gerge 
Aktiefond 0.248 0.168 0.154 0.620 -0.056 0.552 
Cliens Sverige B 0.215 -0.015 0.154 0.557 -0.100 0.530 
Cliens Sverige A 0.202 -0.029 0.160 0.621 -0.115 0.518 
Note: The confidence interval in the table is the 95% confidence level interval. 
Based on the statistical analysis of the funds’ excess net returns it is concluded that investing in a good 
fund, in the sense that the fund generates high returns, is a good idea for the investor, despite the 
excess net returns of the three best funds in our dataset not being significantly greater than zero at the 
95% confidence level. However if one uses a different confidence level than the 95% limit, the 
confidence intervals will be narrower. One can find the new confidence level that pushes all of the 
lower bounds in table 5 above zero by solving the following equation: 0,00202 − 𝑡𝑡 ∗ 0,0016 = 0  (1) 
The 𝑡𝑡-value that solves the equation is 1,2625 ≈ 1,263, which corresponds to a confidence interval at 
approximately an 80% confidence level. This means that the investor can be roughly 80% certain that 
the average excess net return from the fund is greater than zero. One should however note that the 𝑡𝑡-
value that solves (1) in fact corresponds to the worst of the three best funds, so the confidence level is 
greater than 80% for the even better funds. This implies that in the long run, an investor will earn more 
money being invested in a good fund than he/she will earn being invested in the benchmark index. 
This is also confirmed by figure 4, which clearly shows that the best three funds have experienced a 
more rapid growth in value than the index. The fact that there are fund managers who, on average, beat 
the index at a confidence level of at least 80% implies that they can exploit some of the statistical 
arbitrage opportunities that exist in the equity market. They are able to identify companies that are 
mispriced and use this information to design funds that generate positive expected excess returns in 
the long run.   
Based on the statistics of the first step of the analysis it is concluded that fund managers are 
consistently outperforming the market, which is clearly a requirement if it should be interesting for a 
rational investor to buy the fund. This answers the first part of the two-sided research purpose, namely 
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whether or not an investor will earn money when investing in an equity fund. The results clearly show 
that the expected net return from fund investment is positive, given that a good fund is chosen.   
4.2 Comparison between a Fictive Investor and the Best Three Funds 
 
The second step of the analysis is to assess whether or not the fund managers are utilizing the 
statistical arbitrage opportunities that exist in in the equity market to a notable extent. If it is going to 
be interesting for an investor to buy the funds, their performance need to exceed what the investor can 
achieve by him/herself without a great deal of effort. This is tested by first creating a statistically 
sophisticated investment strategy which a fictive private investor could implement him- or herself, 
assuming that the investor is familiar with the relevant statistical and econometric concepts, and 
comparing this to the performance of the funds. If the funds are not outperforming this strategy there is 
obvious room for improvement on the behalf of the fund managers, but if the funds’ average returns 
are significantly greater than the average return generated by the fictive investor, it is concluded that 
fund managers are capitalizing on market opportunities to create substantial positive excess returns.  
The investment strategy that is used to emulate the behavior of the fictive, sophisticated investor is 
based on a time-series regression model fitted to the index series and it is now explained what 
motivates the choice of this model. Inspection of the graphs in figure 1 and figure 2 suggests that 
volatilities of neither funds’ nor index’s value developments are independent of time. There appears to 
be periods of higher and lower volatility that all funds are affected by. This is true for the funds’ net 
returns as well, and since all the time series are tracking the index closely, it is likely that they follow 
roughly the same underlying process as the index. 
It is described by Enders (2015) that models which account for volatility clustering are usually a good 
fit to financial data, specifically ARCH/GARCH models are commonly used. One will also find that 
the use of ARCH/GARCH models is very common in finance literature and research. A few examples 
are Engle (2001), Xekalaki and Degiannakis (2010), Berezka and Masliy (2016), and Ivrendi and 
Guloglu (2012). All of the above argue that ARCH/GARCH models suit financial data as volatility is 
typically not independent of time. Inspection of the graphs in the Data section also leads one to suspect 
that such a model should be used in this particular case. In order to test if a model from the ARCH 
family should be used, ARCH LM tests are performed. The test procedure is the following: 
Step 1) Run the following regression: 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝+1𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  (2) 
where p is the chosen lag order. What lag order to choose depends on the nature of the data and, to a 
great extent, common sense. In this particular case, the lag order was only set to equal 1. The observed 
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fund returns are spread with one month intervals, and it is very unlikely that a fund’s return today is 
significantly connected to the return that the fund achieved two months ago.  
Step 2) The residuals are saved and used in an auxiliary regression: 
𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡
2 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−22 + ⋯+ 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘2 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 (3) 
The lag order, k, is chosen by what seems reasonable. The coefficients are checked for significance 
and signal what lag order the ARCH model is likely to be. In the case of this essay’s analysis, no 
significant coefficients are found for any values of k. This is troublesome to a certain degree, but the 
test should not be blindly trusted. One reason is that if the wrong lag order is chosen, the result of the 
test is very unlikely to be significant. Secondly, the ARCH LM test investigates ARCH terms only. 
The error terms in the real data generating process can follow a different structure, for example a 
GARCH process, which the test does not detect. Since there is no obvious model specification which 
is right for the data, various ARCH/GARCH models are fitted to the index’s returns and the choice of 
model is based mainly on the models’ BIC scores, as the BIC evaluates how likely the model is given 
the set of used parameters. Coefficient significance is also taken into consideration when two different 
models have similar BIC scores. The model selection is data driven and starts with a fairly simplistic 
ARCH(1) model. Other model variations include ARCH(2), GARCH(0,1), GARCH(1,1), 
GARCH(2,1), and GARCH(2,2). Higher lag orders are excluded as it does not make intuitive sense to 
include them. Since the observations are spread with one month intervals it does not make sense to 
include as much as three lags, which would imply that fund returns from three months back influence 
present returns to a notable extent. The structure of the different models’ error terms are the following: 
 
ARCH(1):   ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑚𝑚1𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−12    (4) 
ARCH(2):   ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑚𝑚1𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝛼𝛼2𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−22    (5) 
GARCH(0,1):  ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚0 + 𝛽𝛽1ℎ𝑡𝑡−1   (6) 
GARCH(1,1):  ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑚𝑚1𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝛽𝛽1ℎ𝑡𝑡−1   (7) 
GARCH(2,1):  ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑚𝑚1𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝑚𝑚2𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−22 + 𝛽𝛽1ℎ𝑡𝑡−1  (8) 
GARCH(2,2):   ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑚𝑚1𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝑚𝑚2𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−22 + 𝛽𝛽1ℎ𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2ℎ𝑡𝑡−2 (9) 
 
Table 6 below presents the BIC scores of the examined model variations. 
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Table 6: BIC Scores of Examined Models 
Model Type BIC 
ARCH(1) 5.855 
ARCH(2) 5.932 
GARCH(0,1) 5.913 
GARCH(1,1) 5.908 
GARCH(2,1) 5.777 
GARCH(2,2) 5.816 
 
When inspecting the BIC scores of the different ARCH/GARCH models it becomes evident that the 
GARCH(2,1) specification is the best fit to the index data, even though the differences are very small. 
The GARCH(2,1) model is formulated in the following way: 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿1𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡   (10) 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡√ℎ𝑡𝑡    (11) 
ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑚𝑚1𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝑚𝑚2𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−22 + 𝛽𝛽1ℎ𝑡𝑡−1  (12) 
 
The dependent variable, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, represents the return of the benchmark index at time t. The intercept in the 
level equation is zero by construction since at the starting point all the time series with returns are 
naturally zero. The error term, 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡, consists of a white-noise term, 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡, as well as an ARMA-term, ℎ𝑡𝑡. 
The coefficient estimates of the GARCH(2,1) model are presented in table 7 below. 
 
Table 7: Coefficient Estimates of GARCH(2,1) 
Coefficient Value 
𝜹𝜹�𝟏𝟏 0.244*** 
𝒂𝒂�𝟎𝟎 2.987** 
𝒂𝒂�𝟏𝟏 -0.072*** 
𝒂𝒂�𝟐𝟐 0.344*** 
𝜷𝜷�𝟏𝟏 0.611*** 
BIC Score 5.932 
Note: The significance codes are the following: ‘*’ implies significance at the 0,05 level, ‘**’ signals significance at the 0,01 
level, and ‘***’ means that the parameter is significant at the 0,001 level. The null hypothesis is that the true parameter is 
equal to 0 for all parameters. 
 
The model is used to emulate the sophisticated investor’s behavior. It is assumed here that the investor 
operates according to the following strategy: The investor invests in the benchmark index portfolio 
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and is currently standing in time period 𝑡𝑡. The GARCH(2,1) model is used to forecast returns of the 
benchmark index one period ahead, 𝑡𝑡 + 1. If the forecasted return is negative, the investment is taken 
out of the stock market, and if the forecasted return is greater than one, the investment is kept in the 
stock market. As one period passes, an index return is realized in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. The realized return is 
incorporated in the model and is used when forecasting the return in period 𝑡𝑡 + 2, at the same time the 
first observation in the model is dropped to keep the sample size constant. If the model specification is 
a good fit to the index data, a strategy such as this one will remove many of the negative returns that 
the index realizes, thereby creating high average returns and growth in value. A good fit in this case 
does not mean that the model can forecast the exact returns, but rather that it can foresee the general 
direction of the index, determining whether one should expect positive or negative returns. In short, 
the fictive investor is using a roll-over forecast technique to estimate future returns of the index and 
letting the forecasted returns guide investment decisions. The final comparison in the analysis is made 
between the returns forecasted by the fictive investor’s strategy, for a period stretching from April 
2014 to March 2017, i.e. 36 months, and the returns achieved by the three best funds during the same 
period. The results of this comparison are presented table 10.  
Before the results of the analysis are presented, arguments are presented for the choice of investment 
strategy used by the fictive investor. The strategy is purely empirical in the sense that no corporate 
information, e.g. ratios such as book to market or similar, is used. It is also clear that the strategy is not 
a ready-made one which is just applied. An example of such a ready-made strategy could be using 
Fama’s and French’s three factor model to determine whether or not an asset should be acquired.  The 
intuitive reason behind the purely empirical strategy is that if the investor utilizes various financial 
measurements of asset quality and a strategy that requires extensive knowledge of finance, he/she is 
arguably emulating a financial professional rather than an investor without much experience of 
financial economics. Since the purpose of this step of the analysis is to determine if the financial 
professionals are in fact outperforming an investor without extensive financial knowledge, it is critical 
that the investment strategy is not too similar to one which can be used by a financial professional. 
The degree to which financial professionals are outperforming the index is determined by earlier 
stages of the analysis, so the focus of this comparison is to settle the second of the two parts of the 
research purpose: Is it worth the required fees to let a financial professional manage one’s investment? 
If the managers of the three best funds are not outperforming the fictive investor, who has no real 
knowledge of finance, it is clearly not worth the cost of fees to have the investment managed by a fund 
company. 
A comparison between the returns achieved with the fictive investor’s strategy and just passively 
owning the benchmark index is found in table 8 and table 9 below.  
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 Table 8: Descriptive Statistics, Fictive Investor’s Returns  
Descriptive Statistics, Fictive Investor’s Returns (in %) 
Mean 0.789 
Median 0.000 
Standard Error 0.395 
Skewness 1.417 
 0,9 CI, Lower Bound 0.138 
0,9 CI, Upper Bound 1.439 
Note: The confidence interval in the table is the 90% confidence level interval. 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics, Benchmark Index Returns 
Descriptive Statistics, Benchmark Index Returns (in %) 
Mean 0.789 
Median 1.368 
Standard Error 0.562 
Skewness 0.057 
 0,9 CI, Lower Bound -0.135 
0,9 CI, Upper Bound 1.715 
Note: The confidence interval in the table is the 90% confidence level interval. 
From the tables above one can draw the conclusion that the average returns of the fictive investor’s 
strategy and passively investing in the index are the same, but the strategy based on the GARCH(2,1) 
model produces returns that are more stable above zero. This is also confirmed in the data. For the 36 
month period during which returns are forecasted, only 16.2% of the fictive investor’s returns are 
negative. The corresponding fraction for the benchmark index is 37.8%. Looking at the confidence 
intervals in the tables above, one can see that returns of the fictive investor’s strategy are greater than 
zero at the 90% confidence level, which from the point of statistical arbitrage implies that this strategy 
is preferred. 
The fictive investor’s strategy will now be compared to the three best funds in order to determine how 
well fund managers are performing at exploiting the statistical arbitrage opportunities that can be 
found in the Swedish equity market. The excess returns of the funds are now calculated as              
𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡, where 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 is the net return achieved by the fund in period t, and 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 is the return 
achieved by the fictive investor in period t. The results of this comparison are presented in table 10 
below. 
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics, Best Three Funds’ Excess Returns 
Descriptive Statistics, Excess Returns, Best Three Funds (in %) 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Error 
Skewness 
CI, Lower 
Bound 
CI, Upper 
Bound 
Didner & Gerge 
Aktiefond 0.236 0.343 0.409 -0.197 -0.594 1.066 
Cliens Sverige B 0.237 0.166 0.404 -0.375 -0.582 1.057 
Cliens Sverige A 0.137 -0.026 0.414 -0.198 -0.703 0.977 
Note: The confidence interval in the table is the 95% confidence level interval 
The numbers in the table above are clearly suggesting that all the three best funds are outperforming 
the fictive investor on average. Interestingly though, none of the confidence intervals are strictly above 
zero. The probabilities of the funds’ excess returns being positive are roughly 58% for Didner & 
Gerge Aktiefond, 56% for Cliens Sverige B, and 50% for Cliens Sverige A, which, together with the 
fact that the average excess returns of all the funds are positive, implies that when fund managers beat 
the fictive investor’s strategy they beat it with a larger margin than they lose to it. This suggests that 
the knowledge possessed by financial professionals actually contributes to generating real value.   
The results section of this essay will now be summarized. Firstly, descriptive statistics regarding fund 
returns are produced. These statistics and the graphs in 4.1 motivate that the analysis is restricted to 
only considering the best three funds. If an investor is rational in the sense that she/he is evaluating 
funds based on their returns, there is no reason why that investor should invest in a poorly performing 
fund. The best three funds in the data are, in order, Didner & Gerge Aktiefond, Cliens Sverige B, and 
Cliens Sverige A. The descriptive statistics regarding these funds’ returns are found in Table 4: 
Descriptive Statistics, Net Fund Returns of Best and Worst Funds. These funds’ net returns are 
initially compared to the returns realized by the underlying benchmark index in table 5, and it is 
concluded that one can be certain that these funds generate positive excess returns at an 80% 
confidence level. This implies that fund managers are very likely able to exploit statistical arbitrage 
opportunities. Following this result, the strategy implemented by the fictive investor is outlined and 
compared to the alternative of passively owning an index portfolio in table 8 and table 9. The 
coefficient estimates of the GARCH(2,1) model underpinning the fictive investor’s strategy are found 
in table 7. It is concluded that the fictive investor’s strategy generates returns that are more 
consistently positive than the returns generated by the index. From a statistical arbitrage point of view 
this strategy is preferred to passively owning the benchmark index. Finally, a comparison between the 
fictive investment strategy and the best three funds is made in table 10. On average, the three best 
funds generate returns that are higher than those achieved by the fictive investor. The probabilities of 
these funds’ net returns being greater than the fictive investor’s returns are 58%, 56%, and 50% 
respectively. This implies that when the fund managers beat the fictive investor, they do it by such a 
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margin that the excess returns generated are offsetting the occasions on which they lose to the fictive 
investor. This analysis shows that not only can fund managers exploit statistical arbitrage 
opportunities, they can also use their financial knowledge to create substantial excess returns, even 
when the funds are measured against something more sophisticated than a passive index portfolio.     
4.3 Practical Illustration of the Results 
 
It is concluded above that investing in an actively managed fund is a good idea, in general, but in order 
to illustrate how good of an idea it is, a numerical example will now be presented. Assume that an 
initial amount of 10,000 SEK is invested in one of the three best funds and kept in the chosen fund for 
five years, i.e. 60 months. Using the average monthly net returns in Table 4: Descriptive Statistics, Net 
Fund Returns of Best and Worst Funds, the investment will be worth the following at the end of the 
five year period: 
Didner & Gerge Aktiefond: Approximately. 18,340.25 SEK 
Cliens Sverige B: Approx. 17,984.41 SEK 
Cliens Sverige A: Approx. 17,846.02 SEK 
Discounting these values using the Swedish inflation target of 2%, the investment will have the 
following net present values: 
Didner & Gerge Aktiefond: Approx. 16,611.33 SEK 
Cliens Sverige B: Approx. 16,289.03 SEK 
Cliens Sverige A: Approx. 16,163.69 SEK 
Clearly, investing in the funds generates substantial growth in value, even when future values of the 
investment are discounted. Being passively invested in the index for 60 months yields the following 
the results, using the average return of the index: 
Index: Approx. 16,024.64 SEK 
Net present value of the index: Approx. 14,514.01 SEK 
Since the average return of the fictive investor’s strategy is the same as the index’s average return, one 
would expect the same net present value from an investment that was invested according to the fictive 
investor’s strategy. As mentioned earlier though, the volatility of the fictive investor’s strategy is 
lower than the volatility of the index, implying that the investor’s strategy is preferred.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
The analysis is divided into two parts in order to adequately answer the research purpose, namely to 
investigate if an investor can earn money, in real terms rather than nominal, by simply investing in a 
fund and waiting for the money to grow in value. If that is really the case, it is assessed whether or not 
it is worth paying the required fees to have fund companies manage the investment. The analysis 
presents descriptive statistics that describe relevant aspects of the funds’ returns and compare these to 
the benchmark index. Investing in poorly performing funds is, under reasonable assumptions, not an 
option for the investor, why the analysis is restricted to the three best funds. From table 4 and table 5 it 
is concluded that fund managers are able to exploit statistical arbitrage opportunities. Average excess 
net returns of the funds are greater than zero with a confidence level of at least 80%, depending on 
which of the three best funds one is considering. The analysis can so far conclude that fund managers 
are able to exploit statistical arbitrage opportunities well enough to create a growth in value that, in the 
long run, beats the benchmark index. The second part of the analysis, which concerns whether or not it 
is worth paying the fees that fund management is associated with, compares the returns achieved by 
fund managers to those achieved by a fictive investor following the strategy explained in section 4.2. 
The strategy is based on a GARCH(2,1) time series model that is used to roll-over forecast the returns 
of the benchmark index. When the forecasted return is negative, the investment is taken out of the 
market, generating a return of 0, and when the forecasted return is positive the investment is re-
invested in the benchmark index portfolio. In table 8 one can see that the returns generated by this 
strategy are greater than zero at a 90% confidence level. This investment strategy, which is free and 
does not require financial sophistication, is compared to the three best funds in table 10, and the 
comparison shows that all of the three best funds are on average beating the fictive investor. This 
implies that not only can fund managers exploit statistical arbitrage opportunities, they can also use 
their financial knowledge to create substantial excess returns, even when the funds are measured 
against something more sophisticated than a passive index.     
In other words, fund managers are able to exploit statistical arbitrage opportunities to create excess 
growth in value, and the excess returns that they create are substantial enough to beat an active, but 
free, investment strategy that a private investor can implement him-/herself. The conclusion implies 
that investing in funds is worth the fees, given that a good fund is chosen. This result is concretely 
exemplified in 4.3 Practical Illustration of the Results. 
For a discussion on the scope and limit of the analysis, see the Discussion section below.  
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6. Discussion 
 
A number of questions arose during the course of working with the analysis. In this discussion we will 
address the most interesting ones. The first and perhaps most obvious question is: Why are we using 
the specific investment strategy described in 4.2? What is it based on? The idea behind the investment 
strategy is that the investor should not need financial sophistication. If the strategy is supposed to 
emulate what an investor without financial expertise should be able to achieve, without constantly 
checking on the investment, a number of relevant explanatory variables should not be included. Such a 
strategy is arguably not describing a behavior that a financially non-skilled investor would exhibit. 
The model is of course not optimal in any sense, but trying to create an optimal investment strategy is 
roughly what the professionals within the finance field are trying to do, why it is not really possible to 
claim that an financially non-skilled investor should do the same thing.    
Another issue that was considered was that of commission. When a private person trades equities, 
commission is paid to the broker. This type of trading fee is not included in our analysis. It is 
reasonable to suspect that the exclusion of commission affects our results. After all, the fictive investor 
would in reality need to pay commission every time the investment is moved into or out of the market. 
The fees are however very small. At Nordnet, for instance, there are options of 0.25%, 0.15%, and 
0.069% commission, each class having different minimum commissions. Which class is used is based 
on the amount invested. One could invest 50,000 SEK and only pay a minimum amount of 69 SEK in 
commission. Virtually nothing. Since the amounts are so miniscule, we chose to exclude them from 
our calculations in order to improve readability of the results. Different brokers have different 
commissions and there is no way of determining which of these commission rates that should be used. 
It is also the case, as see just above, that a single broker can have many different commission rates as 
well.    
Another question one could raise regards the performance of the fictive investor’s strategy. Why was it 
not performing better? The tedious but obvious answer is that data was lacking. Observations are 
spread with too long time intervals. The magnitude of the correlation left between returns after an 
entire month is not great. If more frequent data would have been used it is very likely that the 
GARCH-based investment strategy would perform better. Since the investor in our analysis is only 
updating his/her position once a month, the investment is perhaps left in/out of the market for too long 
a period to counter the movement of the index very well. This is perhaps a reason why the BIC values 
are quite small, but given that the data is spread with so long time intervals we are not sure that one 
can easily improve on the model specification we use.  The fact that the ARCH LM tests give non-
significant results makes model specification quite difficult. None of the other versions that are 
examined give better BIC scores though, why the GARCH(2,1) in table 7 is used. And as mentioned in 
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the body of the essay, the model does not need to able to pinpoint future returns, it is enough that it 
predicts the movement of future returns. Given that the probability of receiving a negative return with 
the model is less than half of that probability for the ‘untouched’ index indicates that the model is in 
fact successful at doing this. 
Another data related question is the following: Why are we not forecasting a longer period? A sample 
of historical data is needed for model estimation, and the larger the sample is, the more accurate the 
estimates will be in general. A fairly large sample was kept because we wanted enough observations 
for the parameter estimates to be somewhat accurate. If the model includes parameters that are related 
to each other in reality, it is preferable if the parameter estimates of this relationship are significant. 
Another reason is that we wanted the sample period to cover the volatility clustering that one can 
observe in figure 2.   
When we were studying previous literature on the topic of statistical arbitrage we were of course 
trying to assess the literature objectively. After all it is not yet completely determined that such 
opportunities exist. Some classic theories are not leaving much room for it. The joke described in 
section 2 is a testament to this. We did however conclude that statistical arbitrage opportunities do 
exist. This is mainly based on the fact that it seems extremely unlikely that financial markets are 
efficient. We do not believe that all relevant information for correct pricing of an asset is possessed by 
or available to the public. The inner workings of companies and their plans for the future are not likely 
made public until they are actually set in motion. A company can lose some of its competitive edge by 
e.g. revealing plans of mergers or major organizational transformations too soon. Such information 
would definitely affect the value of a company’s stock, but since the company has incentives not to 
reveal it, it is very unlikely that the price of the stock reflects that information. Hence we find it 
reasonable to assume that statistical arbitrage exists.              
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Appendix 1 
 
List of Funds Included in the Analysis 
 
• Aktie-Ansvar Sverige A 
• AMF Aktiefond Sverige 
• AstraZeneca Allemansfond 
• Carnegie Sverigefond 
• Catella Reavinstfond 
• Cliens Sverige A 
• Cliens Sverige B 
• Danske Invest Sverige 
• Didner & Gerge Aktiefond 
• Enter Sverige 
• Gustavia Sverige SEK 
• Handelsbanken Sverige Selektiv 
• Handelsbanken Sverigefond 
• Handelsbanken Sverigefond Index  
• Länsförsäkringar Sverige Aktiv A 
• Monyx Svenska Aktier 
• Nordea Alfa 
• Nordea Swedish Stars icke-utdelning 
• Skandia Sverige  
• Spiltan Aktiefond Stabil 
• Swedbank Humanfond 
• Swedbank Robur Ethica Sverige 
• Swedbank Robur Sverigefond 
• Öhman Sverige Smart Beta 
 
Data was collected 2017-04-12 
